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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[O]ne of the most significant problems facing the United States 
patent system is the spiraling cost and complexity associated with pat-
ent rights.”2  The perception exists that the U.S. patent adjudication 
system is beset with inefficiencies, inconsistencies, and forum shop-
ping.3  At the same time, the perceived value of patents in a global, 
knowledge-based society is increasingly important to business and the 
economy.4  
A series of bills have been introduced to solve these problems in 
the U.S. patent system by the creation of experienced patent judges in 
the district courts. The first of these bills, H.R. 5418, introduced into 
the House of Representatives on May 18, 2006,5 would provide funds 
to establish a pilot program that would train district judges in handling 
patent cases and add trained clerks.6  H.R. 5418 was never enacted 
                                                                                                                           
 2 ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
COMM. 75 (1992), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/patentact/ 
ACPLR-3.pdf. 
 3 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 
[SUBCOMM. REPORT], 109th Cong. 2 (2005). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c109bills.html (follow “5401-5500” hyperlink; then fol-
low “H.R.5418.RFS” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Summary & Status” hyperlink; then follow 
“All Information” hyperlink). 
 6 H.R. 518 reads: 
AN ACT 
To establish a pilot program in certain United States district courts to encourage en-
hancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. PILOT PROGRAM IN CERTAIN DISTRICT COURTS. 
(a) Establishment- 
(1) IN GENERAL- There is established a program, in each of the United States dis-
trict courts designated under subsection (b), under which-- 
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(A) those district judges of that district court who request to hear cases under which 
one or more issues arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety 
protection must be decided, are designated by the chief judge of the court to hear those 
cases; 
(B) cases described in subparagraph (A) are randomly assigned to the judges of the 
district court, regardless of whether the judges are designated under subparagraph (A); 
(C) a judge not designated under subparagraph (A) to whom a case is assigned under 
subparagraph (B) may decline to accept the case; and 
(D) a case declined under subparagraph (C) is randomly reassigned to one of those 
judges of the court designated under subparagraph (A). 
(2) SENIOR JUDGES- Senior judges of a district court may be designated under 
paragraph (1)(A) if at least 1 judge of the court in regular active service is also so desig-
nated. 
(3) RIGHT TO TRANSFER CASES PRESERVED- This section shall not be con-
strued to limit the ability of a judge to request the reassignment of or otherwise transfer a 
case to which the judge is assigned under this section, in accordance with otherwise appli-
cable rules of the court. 
(b) Designation- The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts shall, not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, designate 
not less than 5 United States district courts, in at least 3 different judicial circuits, in which 
the program established under subsection (a) will be carried out. The Director shall make 
such designation from among the 15 district courts in which the largest number of patent 
and plant variety protection cases were filed in the most recent calendar year that has 
ended, except that the Director may only designate a court in which-- 
(1) at least 10 district judges are authorized to be appointed by the President, whether 
under section 133(a) of title 28, United States Code, or on a temporary basis under other 
provisions of law; and 
(2) at least 3 judges of the court have made the request under subsection (a)(1)(A). 
(c) Duration- The program established under subsection (a) shall terminate 10 years 
after the end of the 6-month period described in subsection (b). 
(d) Applicability- The program established under subsection (a) shall apply in a dis-
trict court designated under subsection (b) only to cases commenced on or after the date 
of such designation. 
(e) Reporting to Congress- 
(1) IN GENERAL- At the times specified in paragraph (2), the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, in consultation with the chief judge of 
each of the district courts designated under subsection (b) and the Director of the Federal 
Judicial Center, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Represen-
tatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the pilot program es-
tablished under subsection (a). The report shall include-- 
(A) an analysis of the extent to which the program has succeeded in developing ex-
pertise in patent and plant variety protection cases among the district judges of the district 
courts so designated; 
(B) an analysis of the extent to which the program has improved the efficiency of the 
courts involved by reason of such expertise; 
(C) with respect to patent cases handled by the judges designated pursuant to subsec-
tion (a)(1)(A) and judges not so designated, a comparison between the 2 groups of judges 
with respect to-- 
(i) the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, of such cases 
on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law; and 
(ii) the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case is filed to the date on 
which trial begins or summary judgment is entered; 
(D) a discussion of any evidence indicating that litigants select certain of the judicial 
districts designated under subsection (b) in an attempt to ensure a given outcome; and 
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into law, but was reintroduced largely unchanged in the 110th Con-
gress as H.R. 34 and again in the 111th Congress as H.R. 628.   
These bills are based on the premise that “[p]atent lawyers, aca-
demics and judges appear to agree that judicial expertise in patent law 
is particularly desirable,”7 and that this expertise is currently lacking.  
District court judges do not have enough exposure to patent cases 
because such cases comprise such a small percentage of their total 
workloads.8  In support of this premise, a top patent jurist noted that, 
in the Northern District of Illinois, one of the historically busiest dis-
trict courts in terms of patent filings, he never had more than 5% of 
his caseload as patent cases.9  
Working on the notion that practice makes perfect, H.R. 5418 
and its progeny propose a system that assigns patent cases to willing 
judges interested in hearing patent cases.10  As a result, the reversal 
rates should be lower for a judge that hears more patent cases.11 
                                                                                                                           
(E) an analysis of whether the pilot program should be extended to other district 
courts, or should be made permanent and apply to all district courts. 
(2) TIMETABLE FOR REPORTS- The times referred to in paragraph (1) are-- 
(A) not later than the date that is 5 years and 3 months after the end of the 6-month 
period described in subsection (b); and 
(B) not later than 5 years after the date described in subparagraph (A). 
(3) PERIODIC REPORTING- The Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, in consultation with the chief judge of each of the district courts des-
ignated under subsection (b) and the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, shall keep 
the committees referred to in paragraph (1) informed, on a periodic basis while the pilot 
program is in effect, with respect to the matters referred to in subparagraphs (A) through 
(E) of paragraph (1). 
(f) Authorization for Training and Clerkships- In addition to any other funds made 
available to carry out this section, there is authorized to be appropriated not less than 
$5,000,000 in each fiscal year for-- 
(1) educational and professional development of those district judges designated un-
der subsection (a)(1)(A) in matters relating to patents and plant variety protection; and 
(2) compensation of law clerks with expertise in technical matters arising in patent 
and plant variety protection cases, to be appointed by the courts designated under subsec-
tion (b) to assist those courts in such cases. 
Amounts made available pursuant to this subsection shall remain available until ex-
pended. 
Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 2006.  
Attest:  
KAREN L. HAAS  
Clerk.  
H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c109: H.R. 5418.RFS: (last visited Mar. 14, 2007)
.
. 
 7 SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra  note 3, at 21 (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, 
New York Office, Fish & Richardson, P.C.). 
 8 See James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial Bench, 
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 429 (2002). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See H.R. 5418, supra note 7. 
 11 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 57. 
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H.R. 5418, while less controversial than other proposals such as 
those creating specialized trial courts, will have little impact if the 
procedures proposed by this bill are in fact already in practice in the 
district courts hearing a large volume of patent cases and if the proce-
dures do not achieve the desired results.  The practice of handing off 
patent cases to willing judges who like taking them is an unofficial 
practice today in some district courts.12  As one judge admits, “A lot of 
my colleagues hate patent cases.  Hate them.  They say, ‘I tell you 
what, if you do my patent case, I’ll do five ERISA cases.’”13  
Further, institutionalizing the practice of using one or two spe-
cialized judges per district court will only exacerbate the existing 
problem of forum shopping.  An unexpected consequence may also be 
an increase in the time to resolve cases because of a shortage of spe-
cialized judges. 
This analysis examines five of the top 10 districts that have his-
torically had the highest volume of patent cases.  For each of these 
five districts, the percentage of patent cases heard by each judge is 
examined.  Based on the testimony and hearing transcripts, patent 
cases should be equally distributed in small percentages to each 
judge.  If a court’s patent case assignment has a non-random distribu-
tion similar to that proposed by H.R. 5418, the reversal rates and 
resolution times should give insight into the success of the proposal.  
If the court exhibits a random patent case assignment, the expecta-
tion is for a higher reversal rate.  Similarly, the reversal rate should 
be inversely proportional to the volume of patent cases.  If this corre-
lation is not evident, then other factors such as local case rules will be 
analyzed for each studied court, to see if there is any correlation to 
success or failure. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Overview of the U.S. Patent System 
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress authority to legislate over patents: “Congress shall have Power . 
. .  To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Interview with Hannibal Travis, former law clerk in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California, and Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University, 
College of Law, Miami, Fla. (discussing patent case assignment practices). See 
http://law.fiu.edu/faculty /faculty_travis.htm. 
 13 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris, & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 683 n.31 
(2004). 
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Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . .. Discoveries.”14  
However, the foundation for the modern patent examination system 
was not laid until the Patent Act of 1836.15  The Patent Act of 1836 
“created the Patent Office, a corps of examiners, modern interference 
practice, administrative appeal practice, and the modern patent num-
bering system.”16   
By the 1970s, the growth of the number of appeals and a shortage 
of appellate judges had created an enormous problem in the U.S. 
Federal Judiciary.17  Regional circuit courts heard complex patent 
cases, resulting in acute problems of forum shopping and lack of uni-
formity in the area of patent law.18  An overcrowded Supreme Court 
docket and the complexity of resolving circuit splits in patent cases 
compounded these problems.19  Congress formed the Hruska Com-
mission to make recommendations for reform.20  “[T]he commission 
identified a lack of uniformity in U.S. patent law across the geo-
graphical [jurisdictions of the District Courts],” resulting in a wide 
variation “in the frequency with which they upheld the validity of pat-
ents.”21  This variation caused a great deal of forum shopping.22  “[T]he 
Hruska Commission recommended that a national appeals court be 
created to handle patent litigation. . . .”23 
The present patent court system dates from the 1982 Federal 
Courts Improvement Act.24  The Federal Courts Improvement Act 
created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”).25  Two earlier courts were essentially merged to form the 
CAFC: the United States Court of Claims and the United State Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals.26  The 73 year-old United States 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was primarily responsible for 
deciding appeals from decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office 
                                                                                                                           
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15 See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress to Useful Arts: American Patent 
Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 11), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC”Y 61, 61 
(1997).  
 16 Id. 
 17 See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2006). 
 18 See A.B.A. TASK FORCE [TASK FORCE], ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, REPORT ON THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/ antitrust/at-comments /2002/reports/federalcircuitreport.pdf. 
 19 See id. at 9. 
 20 See Henry, supra note 17, at 85-86. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. at 86. 
 24 See TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 6. 
 25 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 26 See TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 6. 
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Commission 
(“PTO”) about patent applications and trademark registrations.27  The 
CCPA’s jurisdiction also allowed it to hear appeals from the Court of 
International Trade, primarily dealing with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act. 28  Jurisdiction included appeals from the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (“ITC”), dealing with patent infringement 
by imported goods or by imported goods made with patented U.S. 
processes.29  Among other issues, the Court of Claims dealt with com-
pensation for claims arising from patent infringement against the 
United States, and had exclusive jurisdiction over patents invented for 
the United States.30 
  1.  United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
    (“CAFC”) 
In response to these problems, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established as an Article III 
court on October 1, 1982.31  Unlike the other circuit courts’ regional 
jurisdictions, the CAFC has national jurisdiction in certain subject 
areas including, inter alia, patents and trademarks.32  See Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Patent Jurisdiction of the CAFC
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CAFC has twelve judges, appointed for life by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.34  Judges may elect to take 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent 
Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 771 (2000). 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See About the Court, FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html. 
 32 See id.  Other subject areas include a wide variety: international trade, government 
contracts, certain money claims against the federal government, and veteran’s benefits.  See id. 
 33 See Pegram, supra note 27 at 767. 
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senior status when eligible and handle fewer cases than an active 
judge.35 Each judge has one judicial assistant; active service judges 
employ three law clerks while senior judges only have one law clerk.36  
“Most of the law clerks have a technical degree . . .”37  In addition to 
law clerks with technical backgrounds, there is also a senior technical 
assistant and three technical assistants to the court.38  The technical 
assistants also have technical backgrounds.39  The technical assistants 
assist the judges in reviewing cases before oral argument, by doing 
legal research, drafting memoranda, and participating in the court’s 
process for avoiding conflicts in published opinions.40  Technical assis-
tants also comment on the opinions circulated by the judges.41 
As of 2001, four of the twelve Federal Circuit judges had techni-
cal backgrounds,42 although they all hired law clerks with various 
technical backgrounds.43  Today the composition of technical and non-
technical background of the Federal Circuit judges is similar.  The 
four judges with technical backgrounds from the Moore study are still 
on the bench.44  Of particular note is that two of the other judges with 
non-technical degrees have extensive patent law experience; one has 
authored a textbook on patent law.45  The newest addition is the au-
thor of the Moore Study, Judge Kimberly A. Moore, with an exten-
sive scholarly background in patent law.46 
Today, almost 20% of the CAFC’s crowded docket deals with 
patent appeals.47 Congress expected the creation of the CAFC to give 
judges time for examining and deciding these more complex issues.48  
However, in a typical month, a CAFC judge receives over 2,000 pages 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See About the Court, supra note 31. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Setsuko Asami, Japan-U.S. Patent Infringement Litigation Comparison: A Visit to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 5 CASRIP NEWSLETTER, Fall 1998, 
http://www.law. washington.edu/CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol5/newsv5i3asami.htm. 
 38 See id. at Figure 3. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
12 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 15 n.71 (2002). 
 43 See id. at 15. 
 44 See id. at 15 n.71; see also Judicial Biographies, FEDERAL CIRCUIT,  
http://www.cafc.uscourts. gov/judgbios.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). 
 45 Judges Paul R. Michel and Randal R. Rader, respectively.  See Judicial Biographies, 
supra at note 44; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve 
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24  n. 97 (2001). 
 46 See Judicial Biographies, supra note 44. 
 47 See  Pegram, supra note 27 at 771. 
 48 See id. 
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of briefs and averages slightly more than one appeal per day.49 Be-
cause patents are time consuming, the amount of deliberation and 
time available to spend on the relatively more complex patent appeals 
does not measure up to the CAFC creator’s expectations.50  Given 
that district court holdings are reversed at least 35% of the time, there 
is little penalty to appeal.51  See Table 1. 
Table 1. Percentage of CAFC Workload from Patents 2000-2006. 
 
Percentage of CAFC 
Workload 200052 200153 200254 200355 200456 200557 200658 
USPTO 6.03% 4.99% 4.63% 4.60% 4.02% 4.12% 4.06% 
ITC 0.13% 0.54% 0.51% 0.91% 0.57% 0.45% 0.51% 
U.S. District Courts 30.15% 27.17% 27.46% 32.99% 30.03% 31.38% 29.46% 
  2.  United States Patent Office (“USPTO”) 
The Department of Commerce’s United States Patent Office is 
the administrative agency responsible for granting patents.59 The 
USPTO does not have a direct role in patent infringement actions.60  
The USPTO does not have any formal patent opposition procedure.61   
The types of issues that may go up on appeal to the CAFC are 
reexamination of patents, reissue applications, or inter-party interfer-
ence proceedings.62  Other patentability issues may be raised at the 
interference proceedings.63   In lieu of an appeal to the CAFC, a dis-
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at  4 (2005). 
 52 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2000 ANN. REP. 119, Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf. 
 53 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2001 ANN. REP. 115, Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep01.pdf. 
 54 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2002 ANN. REP. 114, Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf. 
 55 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2003 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep03.pdf. 
 56 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2004 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep04.pdf. 
 57 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2005 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep05.pdf. 
 58 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP.  Table B-8, available at 
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep06.pdf. 
 59 See Pegram, supra  note 27, at 771-72. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
296 FIU Law Review [4:287 
satisfied applicant for a patent may, after exhausting appropriate ap-
peals with the USPTO, file a civil action against the USPTO Director, 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.64  
The number of appeals from the USPTO account for a small per-
centage (typically less than 5%) of the appeals heard by the CAFC.65  
The reversal rate for the USPTO is similarly low.66 
  3.  U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) 
The ITC was created by Congress as an independent agency “to 
administer laws regulating trade with the United States.”67  Of particu-
lar interest to the patent system is the ITC’s authority under section 
337 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to bar importation of goods in-
fringing U.S. patents.68  The imported goods may directly infringe a 
U.S. patent or may be made by a process that infringes a U.S. patent.69  
However, there must be an industry in the United States relating to 
the imported goods.70  For example, in the telecommunications indus-
try, plaintiffs bring their cases before the ITC under Section 337 of the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.71 The ITC attempts to clear these cases in 
under a year, and can issue import bans on products infringing U.S. 
patent law.72 
Plaintiff patent owners find the ITC attractive despite the fact 
that it has no authority to award damages for infringement.73  First, 
there are no geographic or personal jurisdictional limits if the patents 
are infringed by foreign imports.74  Second, “the ITC’s exclusion or-
ders are in rem.”75  Most important to patent owners, however, is the 
rapidity of the ITC’s granting of relief: the typical case is resolved in 
one year “or, at the most, ‘in more complicated’ cases, within eighteen 
months.”76  However, seeking injunctive relief through the ITC does 
not necessarily lighten the District Court workload; because damages 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
 65 See supra Table 1. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Pegram, supra note 27, at 772. 
 68 See id. at 772-73. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Smoot-Hawley’s Revenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2006, at A10. 
 72 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 771-72. 
 73 See id. at 772. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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can only be awarded by a court, many patentees pursue a dual litiga-
tion track for damages in the federal courts.77 
The appeals from the ITC account for a fraction of the caseload 
of the CAFC.78   The reversal rate for ITC decisions are typically 
much lower than those heard from the district courts.79  
  4.  U.S. District Courts 
Just as the complexity of technology has grown, so has the com-
plexity of the court systems.  For example, in 1800 there were only 17 
district court judges, and 6 Supreme Court justices, who also doubled 
as the Circuit Court of Appeals.80  Today, there are over 90 United 
States district courts, having “exclusive, original jurisdiction ‘of any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.’”81  
Serving in these district courts are over 600 United States district 
judges and over 270 senior judges.82  In addition to those Article III 
judges, each district has one or more magistrate judges, who are ap-
pointed for a renewable fixed term and whose powers are more lim-
ited.83 
By statute, the district courts must notify the USPTO of the 
commencement and the disposition of patent suits filed pursuant to 
U.S.C. Title 35.84  Aside from this requirement, several district courts, 
notably the Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of 
California have augmented their local rules with patent specific pro-
cedures.85 
B.  Trends in the Patent System 
The rate of patent filing doubled during the 1990s.86  USPTO fil-
ing projections presented in the Subcommittee Hearing testimony in 
October 2005 painted a dire picture: annual patent filings between 
2000 and 2010 were predicted to grow at only a slightly slower rate 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Steve Seidenberg, Patent Rocket Docket, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 38. 
 78 See supra Table 1. 
 79 See note infra Table 3. 
 80 See Pegram, supra  note 27, at 767-68. 
 81 Id. at 768 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1331)). 
 82 See id. at 769. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See 35 U.S.C. § 290.  
 85 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 900 (2001). 
 86 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Re-
search on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 24 (2005). 
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than in the 1990s.87  In 2000, the USPTO granted about 180,000 pat-
ents.88  If the number of patents issued nearly doubled as well, by 
2010, the potential sources of patent litigation could be overwhelming.  
Fortunately, however, the total numbers of patents granted since 2000 
has remained relatively steady, and even declined somewhat, as re-
flected in  
Table 2.  Total Patent Filings 2000-2005. 
 
Table 2.  Total Patent Filings 2000-2005. 
 
200089 200190 200291 200392 200493 200594 
176,087 184,057 184,428 187,054 181,322 157,740 
 
Even if a patent tsunami has not materialized, however, patent 
litigation has surged.  In 2000, the USPTO granted about 180,000 pat-
ents, which resulted in around 2,000 patent cases.95  By September 30, 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 48 (statement of Chris J. Katopis, Table II — 
USPTO Workload Projections). 
 88 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 86, at 2-3. 
 89 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2000, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ 
oeip/taf/pat_tr00.htm 
 90 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2001, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr01.html. 
 91 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2002 (document dated 04-FEB-2003), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr02.html. 
 92 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2003 (document dated 04-Mar-2004), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr03.html. 
 93 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2004 (document dated 09-FEB-2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr04.html. 
 94 See PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  PATENTING 
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2005 (document dated 08-FEB-2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr05.html. 
 95 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 86, at 2. 
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2004, 3,075 new patent cases were filed in district courts,96a 50% in-
crease in four years.  The recent trend toward seeking speedy injunc-
tive relief from the ITC is threatened by the increasing patent litiga-
tion workload.97  “Fiscal year 2006 set a new high for the agency’s IP 
work.  It launched a record 40 section 337 proceedings between Oct. 
1, 2005, and Sept. 30, 2006.  This was up 38 percent from fiscal year 
2005, and up a whopping 250 percent from four years ago.”98  In June, 
the Intellectual Property Law Section passed a resolution asking the 
ITC to add a third courtroom and a fifth administrative law judge.99  
Damage awards are soaring.100  Jury awards in particular have reached 
the billion-dollar range since 1982.101  “[B]etween 1982 and 1992, the 
damages ranged between $873 million and $19.8 million.”102 In one 
case, Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., the district trial 
court awarded $48 million in damages, which was doubled for willful-
ness, and $8.7 million in interest, plus $23.7 million in attorney’s 
fees–the award totaling over a staggering $130 million.103  On appeal, 
this award was reversed rather than remanded.104  As a result, the con-
sequences of a district judge’s incorrect claim construction105 can be 
quite severe.106  
                                                                                                                           
 96 See SUBCOMM REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of John B. Pegram citing Admin-
istrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts-2004., Table C-
2A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c2a.pdf). 
 97 See Seidenberg, supra note 77. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See Moore, supra note 49, at 11-12. 
 101 See Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All “Three” 
Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (1999).  
 102 See id. 
 103 See Moore, supra note 100, at 11-12. 
 104 See id. at 12. 
 105 See Michael C. Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent 
Cases, 69 TEX. B. J. 1045 (2006).  On the issue of “Claims construction,” Smith says: 
“Claims construction” often requires a brief explanation. One of the aspects of patent cases 
that is unusual–what, in fact, requires the special rules for the initial stages–is the 1995 deci-
sion by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the appellate court to which all patent 
cases are appealed, that the determination of what the terms in a patent mean is a legal issue, 
not a factual one.  Consequently, judges, not juries, must decide what the words in a patent 
mean. 
As noted, patents are essentially deeds to an idea, and the initial question, “What does this 
patent cover?” requires an analysis of what the patent means and covers–not unlike a survey of 
a piece of land.  Judges now do this during “claims construction” or Markman hearings by con-
struing what the terms in the patent claims mean and, accordingly, what the patent covers.  
Essentially, they determine whether a word in the patent means what the plaintiff argues it does, 
what the defendant argues, or something entirely different. 
But the mortality rate of judges’ claims construction rulings in patent cases, which are re-
viewed under the de novo standard, is extraordinarily high on appeal, with the Federal Circuit 
reversing at least part of the judge's ruling approximately 40 percent of the time.  But not in 
Marshall.  Despite handling more than 200 patent cases between them at a time, Judges Ward 
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Complexity is increasing.107 Two hundred years ago, patent law 
was not particularly complex.108  Travel and communication was ex-
ceedingly difficult, possibly a reason for so few litigations–one had to 
know about an infringement for there to be a dispute.109  In contrast, 
by 1999, over 2,318 patent litigation cases were filed.110 
When the few cases were litigated, the technology was likely to 
be understood by “farmer-jurors.”111  Today, the complexity of tech-
nology has increased to the point where patent cases consume 9.4% of 
the time for all civil cases, while only accounting for .57% of the 
caseload.112 
Many attribute the increased costs, inconsistencies, and forum 
shopping to two factors:  the relatively high rate of reversals of district 
court patent decisions, and the relatively long time to resolve patent 
cases in the district courts.113 
  1.  Wide Variation in Resolution Times by District Courts 
One of the purposes of the creation of the CAFC was to improve 
the uniformity in patent law and decisions, because of “notorious dif-
ference[s]” between the PTO and the courts.114  Forum shopping was 
rampant because of significant divergences among the regional courts 
of appeal.115  Although most would agree that the CAFC largely has 
met this goal, the problem of forum shopping in patent cases contin-
ues to be widespread today at the trial court level.116  Empirical studies 
show that patent cases are not dispersed evenly throughout the dis-
trict courts, but tend to be consolidated in a few select jurisdictions.117  
                                                                                                                           
and Davis have never been reversed by the Federal Circuit–the closest either has come was a 
revision of one claim term in one order by Judge Ward.  This startling fact underscores the ex-
pertise that the local judges have developed in these complex cases. For better or worse, when 
the judge hands down his construction of the terms in the patent, thus setting the metes and 
bounds of the plaintiff's invention, the ruling is–at least thus far–virtually bulletproof on ap-
peal. 
Id. at 1048. 
 106 See Moore, supra note 100, at 11-12. 
 107 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 767. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See Moore, supra note 85, 933. 
 113 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 114 See id. at 15 (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish & 
Richardson, P.C.). 
 115 See id. 
 116 See Moore, supra note 112, at 889-90, 903. 
 117 See id. at 889, 892, 903. 
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Patent cases are prone to forum shopping for several reasons.  
Because of the increasingly global nature of commerce, and liberaliza-
tion of jurisdiction and venue statutes, particularly for corporate de-
fendants, a patent plaintiff’s choice of district courts is widely ex-
panded and expedites forum shopping.118 There is a wide variation in 
the time district courts take to resolve patent cases.119  The relatively 
long time to resolve patent cases by itself would directly impact litiga-
tion costs.120  Because there is a wide variation among the district 
courts in the times to dispose of cases, plaintiffs seeking relief search 
out the quickest patent courts, known as “rocket dockets.”121  An ex-
ample of the legal gyrations that plaintiffs perform to get within the 
jurisdiction of one of the rocket dockets involved one plaintiff’s para-
legal ordering a device made in Florida, and shipping it to Virginia.122 
Three of the five fastest districts for resolution are “in the ‘top 
twenty’ in terms of number of patent cases.”123  None of the five slow-
est districts are in the top twenty districts in terms of patent litiga-
tion.124  Because of these differences, many litigants are “voting with 
their feet;” relief in some patent cases is being sought outside the judi-
ciary.125 
  2.  High Reversal Rate of District Court Decisions 
A high reversal rate is an indicator of confusion among the lower 
courts.126  A study of every patent case that went to trial between 1983 
and 1999 shows that the high reversal rate was primarily in the area of 
claim construction.127   The reversal rate for validity claims was  22%, 
for infringement claims was 20%,  for enforceability was 24%, and for 
willfulness was 15%.128    
Data for the years 2000-2006 show the number of appeals filed 
and reversed by the CAFC from the District Courts.  See Table 3 be-
low. 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See id. at 892-95. 
 119 See id. at 908-09. 
 120 See O’Malley, supra note 13, at 681. 
 121 See Moore, supra note 85, at 900 n.47. 
 122 See T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Patent Enforcement of Patents in the 
United States Courts, CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES NO. 5: STREAMLINING INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1999, at 14. 
 123 Moore, supra note 85, at 909. 
 124 See id. at 909. 
 125 See Smoot-Hawley’s Revenge, supra note 71. 
 126 See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Pre-
dictible?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231 (2005). 
 127 See Moore, supra note 42, at 13-15. 
 128 See id. at 14. 
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Table 3.  Reversal Rates by the CAFC 2000-2006 
 
Reversal Rates 2000
129
 2001
130
 2002
131
 2003
132
 2004
133
 2005
134
 2006
135
 
USPTO 17% 12% 20% 7% 3% 9% 3% 
ITC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 40% 
U.S. District Courts 16% 23% 23% 11% 13% 13% 13% 
 
Different authorities cite varying figures for the number of rever-
sals of district court decisions by the CAFC.  The reversal rate for the 
district courts by the CAFC is approximately 35%.136  Another scholar 
finds the reversal rates are 33% because district court judges improp-
erly construed patent claim terms.137 Yet another study shows that 
reversal of claim construction decisions in the last six months of 2003 
is running about seventy-one percent.138  For example, over the year 
2003, the reversal rate has been 58%, while other more conservative 
estimates place it around 47%.139  During the 10 years since the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Markman,140 the reversal rate has steadily 
increased.141  Whether the actual reversal rate is a staggering 71% for 
a six-month period or 33%, the average reversal rate in other circuits 
is about 17% to 20% .142   
The high reversal rate has an impact on litigation strategy and the 
courts in three ways: 1) Patent litigation is far too expensive; 2) parties 
go through legal “gyrations” to get the case to appeal to avoid a whole 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See supra note 52. 
 130 See supra note 53. 
 131 See supra note 54. 
 132 See supra note 55. 
 133 See supra note 56. 
 134 See supra note 57. 
 135 See supra note 58. 
 136 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore). 
 137 See Moore, supra note 42, at 1-3. 
 138 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. White, A Panel Discussion: Claim Con-
struction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 690 n.31 
(2004). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See generally Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 141 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 21 
(2005) (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictables?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245-247 (2005).  
 142 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris, & Ronald H. White, A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 679 (2004). 
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trial, only to have claim construction reversed; and 3) district court 
judges, to some degree, are demoralized.143   
One study notes that an average patent infringement suit in Cali-
fornia will cost each party over two million in litigation expenses.144 
Run of the mill cases cost $1.2 million to $10 million to get through 
Markman.145   
However, another empirical study shows that the results for ex-
penditures in patent cases are not excessively high.146  This study meas-
ured cost as a function of the length of time to termination, number of 
documents filed in court, and whether cases reach the stage of filing for 
a summary judgment.147  Overall, another study found that the litigation 
costs and settlement costs, though similar, were relatively modest.148  
For example, slightly over 40% of all patent cases remained unresolved 
after 360 days; less than 10% were unresolved after 1080 days.149 
The backlog of unresolved pending appeals from the District 
Courts in the CAFC has remained fairly constant over the last six 
years.  See Table 4.  The backlog of appeals pending in the CAFC 
from the District Courts at the end of each year is typically the highest 
of any other category.  Although fairly constant, however, these cases 
amount to almost 1/3 of annually pending cases.150   
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. at 681. 
 144 Report of Economic Survey, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N 72 (1999).  
 145 O’Malley et al., supra note 142, at 681. 
 146 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 
281-82 (2006). 
 147 Id. at 257-58.  
 148 Id. at 281-82. 
 149 Id. at 283 fig.2b. 
 150 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf. 
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Table 4. CAFC Annual Backlog of Pending Patent Cases. 
  2000
151
 2001
152
 2002
153
 2003
154
 2004
155
 2005
156
 2006
157
 
Total Pending End 
of Year 422 350 408 408 364 376 402 
  3.  District Court Judges are Demoralized   
Some scholars claim that the 33% error rate creates doubt about 
the abilities of district court judges to decide complex technical patent 
cases.158  This has led at least one district court judge to joke that: “the 
easiest thing to do is figure out what your decision is and write the 
opposite.159”  Another judge asks: “Are we district judges just stu-
pid?”160 
Judge Samuel B. Kent eloquently sums up his feelings: 
Frankly, I don’t know why I’m so excited about trying to bring 
this thing [patent suit] to closure.  It goes to the Federal Circuit 
afterwards.  You know, it’s hard to deal with things that are ulti-
mately resolved by people wearing propeller hats.  But we’ll just 
have to see what happens when we give it to them.  I could say 
that with impunity because they’ve reversed everything I’ve ever 
done, so I expect fully they’ll reverse this, too.161 
Yet another judge points to the relative infrequency of patent 
cases, inflexible case assignment procedures, time consuming nature 
of patent cases and even shifts some of the blame to a lack of feed-
back from the CAFC: 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2000 ANN. REP., at 119 tbl.B-8, available at 
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf.. 
 152 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2001 ANN. REP., at 115 tbl.B-8, available at 
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep01.pdf. 
 153 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2002 ANN. REP., at 114 tbl.B-8, available at 
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf. 
 154 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2003 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at 
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep03.pdf. 
 155 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2004 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/aosep04.pdf. 
 156 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2005 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf.  
 157 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf. 
 158 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 12 
FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 2 (2002). 
 159 O’Malley et al., supra note 142, at 682-83. 
 160 Id. at 682. 
 161 Moore, supra note 158, at 9.  
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My duties as a U.S. District judge require that I be a generalist. . . . 
Only senior judges . . . can turn away cases which are otherwise 
randomly assigned to them.  I cannot, except in the rare instance 
of recusal. 
 . . . 
[O]nly when a patent case comes our way do we brush up on the 
latest developments in patent laws. We do not as a matter of 
course receive the opinions issued by the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in chambers as we U.S. District 
Judges do the Opinion of our respective regional federal appel-
late courts.162 
C.  H.R. 5418  
The major rationale behind H.R. 5418 is that “the district court 
judges have too little exposure to develop the skills necessary for effi-
cient conduct of such litigation.”163  One of the claims is that federal 
district court judges have not developed expertise in patent cases, es-
pecially claim construction, because, on average, they have only one 
patent trial every 6 to 8 years.164  In the district court system, there are 
nearly 680 active district court judges and another 290 senior judges 
that currently hear around 3% of the approximately 3000 patent cases 
filed each year.165  For example, in FY 2004, this meant that the aver-
age district court judge received only 4-5 new patent cases each year, 
amounting to only around 1% of their caseload.166 Even in one of the 
historically busiest district courts for patents, the U.S. District Court 
in Chicago, one judge reported that his patent case workload never 
exceed five percent.167   
                                                                                                                           
 162 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5-
6 (2005) (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish & Richardson, 
P.C) (quoting Judge Holderman). 
 163 Id. 
 164 John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Liti-
gation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 770 (2000). 
 165 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 
(2005) (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore). 
 166 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 
(2005) (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish & Richardson, 
P.C.). 
 167 H.R. Rep. No. 109-673, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?& 
report=hr673&dbname=109&. 
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The American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property 
passed a resolution supporting in principle a pilot program of the type 
contemplated in H.R. 5418.168  A number of other patent related trade 
associations, which include AIPLA, IPO, BSA, CEA, ACT, BIO, and 
PhRMA have expressed support for the enactment of the pilot pro-
gram. 169 
The opposition cited a lack of evidence of a problem with district 
court patent cases, and no evidence that H.R. 5418 would solve a pur-
ported problem.170  The supporters said that empirical studies show a 
problem and that “foreign countries have benefited from setting up 
specialized courts to handle patents.”171   
H.R. 5418 was introduced into the 109th Congress on March 26, 
2006, passed in the House, and referred to the Senate on September 
29, 2006.  On November 13, 2006, the bill was referred to the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary.172 
  1.  Proposed Case Assignment System 
Section 137 of 28 U.S.C.A provides that the local rules and order 
of the district court will govern the division of business, including case 
assignments, among the district judges.173  The chief judge of the dis-
trict court is responsible for the enforcement and observance of the 
case assignments according to these local rules.174  If the district judges 
in any district are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders 
for that purpose the judicial council of the circuit shall make the nec-
essary orders.175  
                                                                                                                           
 168 ABA Comm. on Intell. Prop., Resolution 601-8 (2000), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/jun00chair.html.  The Resolution was approved to establish a 
pilot program to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among patent judges or 
similar legislation.  The Resolution supports, in principle, the implementation of a pilot program 
to determine whether the consolidation of patent cases among designated judges in whose dis-
tricts such cases are filed improves the litigation of patent cases; and, SPECIFICALLY, the 
Section supports, in principle, a pilot program of the type contemplated by H.R. 5418 (109th 
Congress, 1st Sess.) (2005) (Issa).  
 169 H.R. Rep. No. 109-673, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?& 
report=hr673&dbname=109&. 
 170 ABA IP Law Section on Pilot Program For Trying Patent Cases, Resolution 72 PTCJ 
235 (2006). 
 171 Id. 
 172 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c109bills.html (follow [5400 - 5500] hyperlink; then follow 
[H.R.5418.RFS] hyperlink; then follow [Bill Summary & Status] hyperlink; then follow [All 
Information] hyperlink). 
 173 28 U.S.C. § 137.     
 174 Id. 
 175 Id.  
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Case assignment may be prescribed by local court rules per 28 
U.S.C.A. § 137 or by general order.176  One system that many courts 
use is the blind assignment of cases to particular judges.177  Under such 
an assignment plan, a party does not learn which judge will hear the 
case until after the case is filed, and the clerk has no discretion in as-
signing cases.178  A general order providing for the assignment of cases 
which have been identified by the chief judge as protracted, difficult, 
or widely publicized was within the power granted by 28 USCA § 137 
to control the assignment of cases so as to facilitate the business of the 
court.179  Similarly, district judges may by rule, order, or consent trans-
fer cases between themselves for the expeditious administration of 
justice.180 
The Pilot Program proposes a case assignment system in which 
district judges may request that the chief judge of the court designate 
them to hear patent or plant variety cases.181 Initially, a patent or plant 
variety case is randomly assigned to any of the judges in that district 
court.182  However, if a judge who has not been designated as a patent 
judge is assigned to a case, that judge may decline to accept the case.183  
A case so declined is then randomly assigned to one of the designated 
patent judges.184  Senior judges can be designated as patent judges; 
however, there must be at least one active judge designated as a pat-
ent judge.185  The local rules of transferring and reassigning cases are 
not affected by the rules of the H.R. 5418 pilot program.186 
  2.  Criteria for Pilot Courts 
At least five courts will be chosen for the Pilot Program by the 
Administrative Office of the United State Courts in at least 3 different 
judicial circuits.187  These courts will be chosen from among the top 15 
district courts in which the largest number of patent and plant variety 
protection cases was filed in the most recent calendar year.188  The 
                                                                                                                           
 176 United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204-05 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
 177 J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of 
Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1075 tbl.1 (2000). 
 178 Id. at 1075. 
 179 Keane, 375 F. Supp. at 1204-05.  
 180 Id. 
 181 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (A). 
 182 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (B). 
 183 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (C). 
 184 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (D). 
 185 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (2). 
 186 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (3). 
 187 .R. 5418 § (1) (b). 
 188 Id. 
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court must also have at least 10 district judges,189 of which at least 
three have requested to be designated as patent judges.190  The most 
recent incarnation of H.R. 5418, H.R. 628, was amended to include 
courts that have adopted local patent rules. 
3.  Metrics 
The success of the ten-year pilot program will be measured on a 
number of factors191–which include: 
(A) an analysis of the extent to which the program has succeeded 
in developing expertise in patent and plant variety protection 
cases among the district judges of the district courts so desig-
nated; 
(B) an analysis of the extent to which the program has improved 
the efficiency of the courts involved by reason of such expertise; 
(C) with respect to patent cases handled by the judges designated 
pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) and judges not so designated, a 
comparison between the 2 groups of judges with respect to– 
(i) the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, of such cases on the issues of claim construction and sub-
stantive patent law; and 
(ii) the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case is 
filed to the date on which trial begins or summary judgment is 
entered;192 
Two key measurements are made:  1) the rate of reversal by the 
CAFC of patent cases on issues of claim construction and substantive 
patent law; and 2) the period of time elapse from the date on which a 
case is filed to the date on which trail begins or summary judgment is 
entered.193 
III.  COMMENTARY 
A.  Case Assignment and Reversal Rates in Selected Courts 
This analysis looks at the case assignment profile for five district 
courts.  The case assignment system proposed by H.R. 5418 should 
                                                                                                                           
 189 H.R. 5418 § (1) (b) (1). 
 190 H.R. 5418 § (1) (b) (2). 
 191 H.R. 5418 § (1) (e). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
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produce a non-random assignment of patent cases to designated 
judges.  If the distribution of cases to district judges is totally random, 
one would expect to see roughly the same percentage of patent cases 
heard by each district judge.  If a court’s assignment profile was non-
random, then the actual procedures would simulate the procedures 
proposed by H.R. 5418, and might shed light on H.R. 5418’s impact.  
The district courts were chosen for this study based on the vol-
ume of patent litigation for the period between 1995-1999.  Although 
the Eastern District of Virginia technically will not qualify for the pi-
lot program because there are fewer than 10 judges,194  it was included 
because of its patent rocket-docket reputation, its ranking as number 
eight in patent volume,195 and because its Chief Judge, T.S. Ellis, III, 
testified at the H.R. 5418 congressional hearings as an expert in patent 
litigation.196  In addition, the Eastern District of Texas has gained re-
cent popularity as a patent rocket docket and was included for that 
reason.197  See Table 5.  The statistics are examined for each court 
separately, due to the varying number of judges in each court. 
Table 5.  Data for District Courts Chosen For Study
198
 
Rank Court Number % of Total 
1 Central District of California 870 9.1 
2 Northern District of California 606 6.3 
3 Northern District of Illinois 569 5.9 
8 Eastern District of Virginia 288 3.0 
- Eastern District of Texas - - 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See C. Erik Hawes & James Beebe, H.R. 5418 and Specialized “Patent Courts”: The 
Latest Congressional Effort at Patent Reform, 25 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., at 18 (2007). 
 195 See Moore, supra note 85, at 902-03. 
 196 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing on H.R. 5418 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 69 (2005) (statement of T.S. Ellis, III, Chief Justice, Eastern District of Vir-
ginia). 
 197 See C. Erik Hawes & James Beebe, Is Texas at Risk of Being Excluded from Latest 
Congressional Patent Reform Effort?, ST. B. TEX. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., Winter 2007, at 6, 
available at http://www.texasbariplaw.org/newsletters.htm (click on “Winter 2007”). 
 198 Moore, supra note 111, at 902-03 (showing no data for the Eastern District of Texas in 
this study). 
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  1.  The Data 
The data for these courts were obtained from Westlaw profiler-
WLD199 database for each district court judge.  The list of judges for 
each court was obtained from the home page of the district court.200  
All judges listed–active, magistrate, and senior judges–were in-
cluded.  H.R. 5418 allows senior judges to be designated if at least one 
active judge is also designated.201  Magistrate judges are not included 
because, under H.R. 5418 §1(b) (1), the judges must be appointed by 
the President under 28 U.S.C. 133(a), or “on a temporary basis under 
other provisions of law.”202 
For each judge, a Document-List query was run for the period 
between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2006.  The Document-
List query returned all cases on that judge’s docket for that period.  
This included judicial opinions as well as court orders.  A search filter 
allowed queries to distinguish between judicial opinions and docket 
items.  
Most importantly, administrative office of the District Court’s de-
termination classifies each item in the document list by the “Nature of 
the Suit.” 203 The Nature of the Suit field is listed in Westlaw as the 
Primary Case Type.204  Therefore here, the primary case type of “In-
                                                                                                                           
 199 This database, available through Westlaw, contains profiles of attorneys and judges, and 
contains more than 1,000,000 profiles of law firms, offices, and lawyers from all 50 states, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, Canada, England, and Europe.  The profiles 
are linked to cases and documents, starting in 1990. 
 200 See http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/ (click on “Judges Procedures and Schedules); 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (click on “Judges”); http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/ (click on 
“Judges”); http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/locations/ale.htm#telephone; http://www.ilnd.uscourts. 
gov/home/Judges. 
aspx. 
 201 H.R. 5418 § 1(a) (2). 
 202 H.R. 5418 § 1(b) (1). 
 203 Studies have found that only 5% of all cases listed by the Patent Trade Office were not 
included as patent cases in the Administrative Office’s data, indicating that the AO data is rela-
tively complete. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? 
An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 237, 250 n.84 (2006). 
 204 Instant Message Conversation with Patrick Y., Westlaw Technical Support (2008) (on 
file with author). Relevant portions of the conversation are as follows: 
. . . 
You Say: Does Westlaw use the Nature of Suit field from the original case 
data?  
 . . . 
Patrick Y. Says: OK--I know what you mean. Yes–these Primary Case Type 
designations come from the Nature of Suit field as found in our Dockets 
You Say: What is the original source data for your docket information? 
Patrick Y. Says: The courts themselves--our dockets are linked directly 
to the court’s docket system. . . . 
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tellectual Property — Patents” was used–this excluded copyright and 
trademark cases. 
By combining the filters for judicial opinions and primary case 
type, the list of all patent opinions for each judge for the specified 
time period was returned.  Each opinion was annotated with the 
Westlaw symbols for history, including whether the case had been 
overturned on a point of law. The reversal rate was determined from 
this indicator by a manual count.205 The raw numbers for each judge 
were generated by case type, expanded, sorted, and exported into Mi-
crosoft Excel™, where the following percentages were calculated:  
Patents as Percentage of Docket:  the number of docketed patent 
items to total docket, including judicial opinions; 
Patents as Percentage of Judicial Opinions: the number of patent 
judicial opinions to total judicial opinions;  
Patent Reversal Rate:  the number of patent judicial opinions that 
were overturned on at least one point of law compared to the 
number of patent judicial opinions.   
Overall Reversal Rate:  the total number of patent cases reversed 
compared to the total number of patent cases.  
Note that the patent reversal rate includes all reversals, not just 
reversals in the narrow area of claim construction.  As a result, rever-
sal rates may appear lower than in that smaller subset.  However, be-
cause the hypothesis being tested is that the more experience a district 
judge has in patent law, the lower the reversal rate, procedural rever-
sals would be expected to decline as well as reversals due to claim 
construction.  Consequently, reversals of all types were included, re-
gardless of type or number of claims. 
  2.  The Eastern District of Texas: Divisional Assignment 
In the most recently favored stop for patent litigation, the East-
ern District of Texas, cases are assigned randomly, but each judge is 
assigned a fixed percentage of cases from each division.  The Chief 
Judge, exercising this power pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137, periodically 
issues General Orders modifying the percentages as needed by shift-
ing workloads, recusals, new appointments, and retirements.  For ex-
ample, the caseload for one active Article III judge might get 35% of 
all civil cases from a particular district, 100% of the criminal cases 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Because of the small number of patent decisions, as opposed to docketed items, the 
manual count was straightforward, but still prone to transcription error. 
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from another district.206  The workloads for magistrate judges are simi-
larly designated.207 
In practice, the total statistics of caseload for 2001-2006 show a 
wide variation in the percentage of patent cases in the judges’ work-
load.  A sampling of data for the Eastern District of Texas (the coun-
try’s latest patent rocket docket208) shows some surprising results.  
Rather than an even distribution, two district judges account for 
around 18% of all patent cases heard. See Table 6. 
Table 6.  Eastern District of Texas Case Workload 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, decisions of the judges in the Eastern District of Texas 
were seldom reversed as seen in Figure 2.  Surprisingly, for this period 
only one judge showed a non-zero reversal rate of about 25%.  The 
top jurists had no reversals.  However, no strong correlation seems to 
exist between the number of patent cases heard and the reversal rate; 
all but one of the judges who only had 3% or less of their docket filled 
with patent cases, had no reversals.   
                                                                                                                           
 206 E.D. TEX. GEN. ORD. No. 06-13, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/ 
Rules/GeneralOrders/2006/GO-06-13.pdf. 
 207 E.D. TEX. GEN. ORD. No. 04-23, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/ 
GeneralOrders/2004/go04-23.pdf. 
 208 Michael C. Smith, Three more news stories on ED patent docket, EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
TEXAS FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE, Oct. 5, 2006, http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_ 
texas/2006/10/three_more_news.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 
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Figure 2.  ED TX Patent Reversals to Docket 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  The Eastern District of Texas case assignment prac-
tice is similar to the one proposed by H.R. 5418.  No strong correla-
tion is seen between the practice with patent cases and lower reversal 
rates. 
  3.  Northern District of California: Ballot System 
The Northern District of California’s case assignment system is 
designed to be proportionate, random, and blind.209  A ballot system is 
used, which can be either manual or automated.210  The clerk of the 
court assigns cases to judges who have chambers in the courthouse in 
which the action arises.211  One ballot per judge is placed in a given 
case category.212  Newly filed cases are assigned to one of seventeen 
categories.213  Within each category, the assignments should result in 
an approximately equal distribution of newly filed civil cases within 
                                                                                                                           
 209 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (a), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 210 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (b), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 211 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (1), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 212 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (b), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 213 Id. 
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each of the categories.214  Patent cases are assigned to the Intellectual 
Property category, which also includes trademark and copyright 
cases.215   
A separate system of assignment is maintained for intellectual 
property cases.216 The system is still random, but venue can be in any 
courthouse in the district, not just the courthouse in which the case is 
filed initially.217  Thus, patents cases are randomly assigned to any of 
the judges in the district, thereby eliminating an opportunity for judge 
shopping.    
Reassignment of cases in the Northern District is generally done 
for the usual reasons, including an intra-district reassignment of cases 
due to volume.218  However, intellectual property cases are excepted 
from this rule and cannot be reassigned to load balance.219  Like any 
other cases, except for a capital habeas corpus case, an intellectual 
property case may be reassigned between judges.220  Reassigning a 
case between judges required written orders by the transferring judge 
and the accepting judge, and does not require any additional ap-
proval.221  Under such a system, a judge who does not want to hear a 
patent cases could transfer to a willing patent judge. 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Id. 
 215 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (5), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.  
 216 Id. Other categories of cases that have separate assignment plans include Prisoner Peti-
tions, Securities Class Actions, and Capital Habeas Corpus cases. Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (E), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 219 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (5) (2), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 220 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (E) (4), available at http://www.cand.uscourts. 
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument. 
 221 Id. 
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Table 7.  Northern District of California 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ND CA Patent Reversals to Docket 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Central District of California: Automated Case Assignment 
 System 
The Central District of California has a random assignment sys-
tem known as the Automated Case Assignment System (ACAS) or 
Assignment Wheel.222  The system is designed to have an equal num-
ber of cases assigned to each judge over a period of time.223  After fil-
ing and numbering a case, the Clerk used the ACAS system to ran-
                                                                                                                           
 222 C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO. 05-06 § 21.2. 
 223 Id.  
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domly obtain the name of the judge to whom the case will be as-
signed.224 
The case stays with the judge to whom the cases is assigned until 
terminated or transferred.225 A case can be transferred by an order 
jointly signed by the transferor and transferee judges.226 If such a 
transfer is made it shall be debited and credited against the transferor 
and transferee judges, respectively, in the ACAS.227  A self-recusing 
judge may appeal the transfer as not being “a case of equal or similar 
weight and complexity.”228 
The case assignment statistics from the Central District of Cali-
fornia show substantial skew.  Here, one district judge appears to be 
the predominant favorite for being assigned patent cases.  Coming in 
at between 5-6 of the case load, three other judges are not even close 
seconds–but are still significant considering that they match or ex-
ceed the highest percentage of case load seen by the top patent jurist 
in the Northern District of Illinois.  The patent assignments to other 
judges are less than 5%. 
Table 8. Central District of California 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No strong correlation appears between the number of patent 
opinions reversed with the size of a judge’s patent docket. See Figure 
4.  Four judges with only 2% of their workload had high reversal 
rates; but so did the judge with a 10% workload. 
                                                                                                                           
 224 Id. 
 225 C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO. 05-06 § 3.2.1. 
 226 Id.  
 227 Id. 
 228 C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO.  05-06 § 3.2.2. 
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Figure 4: CD CA Patent Reversals to Docket 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  The Central District of California practices a as-
signments similar to that proposed by H.R. 5418, but no negative cor-
relation exists between reversal rates and assignments. 
  5.  The Eastern District of Virginia: Equitable Distribution 
The Eastern District of Virginia has been nicknamed the rocket 
docket for good reason:  this district is the quickest of all districts in 
regards to patent litigation.229 The Eastern District of Virginia, was 
ranked eighth in volume for the period 1995-1996, and was favored 
for years as a patent rocket docket because of a reputation as the 
quickest judicial districts for patent cases, with a resolution mean time 
of .43 years.230 In 2001, the Eastern District of Virginia led all other 
district courts in the shortest time to resolution with a mean of .43 
years; in contrast the mean time for all district courts is 1.12 years.231 
In, the Eastern District of Virginia232, the data suggest that blind 
assignment process is actually practiced and no one judge hears a lar-
ger number of patent cases than another.  See Table 9. 
                                                                                                                           
 229 Moore, supra note 198, at 19, Table 3. 
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. 
 232 T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Patent Enforcement of Patents in the United 
States Courts, 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING INT’L INTELL. PROP. 11, 14 
(1999).  
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Here, reversal rates were overall low for all judges.  Only one judge 
experienced reversals. See Figure 1.  This reversal rate was unremark-
able — around 9%. 
Figure 5. ED VA Patent Reversals to Docket 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  The Eastern District of Virginia actually practices 
equitable random distribution of patent cases with little ill affect on 
the reversal rate.  Again, no strong correlation appears between re-
versals and caseload. 
  6.  Northern District of Illinois:  Equitable Assignment Decks 
The Northern District of Illinois historically has been one of the 
busiest patent district courts.233  For more than 50 years, the Northern 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See Holderman, supra note 8, at 4. 
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District has used a random assignment system.234  An important goal 
of the rules and procedures for case assignment and reassignment 
procedures is to secure “an equitable distribution of cases, both in 
quantity and kind, among the judges.” 235   
The case assignment system is computerized.  Both civil cases 
and criminal cases first are grouped into categories, usually by the 
type of case.  The workload is balanced as the case types for each 
category are chosen to generate about the same amount of judicial 
work.  Each category has its own “assignment deck”236 containing the 
name of each regular active judge on full assignment.  Senior judges 
appear half as often.  After verification of the case number and cate-
gory, the computer “shuffles” the assignment deck to pick a judge 
from one of the unused names remaining in the assignment deck for 
the category selected.  Once assigned, computerized reassignment 
procedures ensure the equitable distribution of the caseload.237  Such a 
distribution serves to provide the new judge with a calendar that is 
reasonably close to the average in terms of workload.238 
Just as in the Senate Subcommittee testimony, all but one of the 
judges’ workloads exceeded 5%. Even with such emphasis placed on 
random case assignment, the statistics show that two of the judges 
average 1.5 to 2 times as many patent items on the docket for the 
years 2001-2006. See  Table 10.  Moreover, the low number of patent 
cases to the other judges is most likely a result of the equitable case 
distribution system enforced by the local court rules, not a scarcity of 
patent cases–the Northern District of Illinois is one of the top district 
courts in overall patent volume. The remaining assignments follow an 
expected curve, accounting for some senior judges having as little as 
half the workload of an active judge. 
                                                                                                                           
 234 N.D. Ill. LR.40.1 (committee comment). 
 235 N.D. Ill. LR40.1(a).  Assignment of Cases: General. 
 236 “Prior to the introduction of the computerized assignment system, physical decks of 
assignment cards were used. The terms ‘assignment deck; and even ‘assignment card’ continue 
in use as metaphors to describe the manner in which the computer operates.”  N.D. Ill. LR 40.1 
Committee Comment. 
 237 N.D. Ill. LR 40.1 (d). 
 238 N.D. Ill. Court Rules, at 14-16. 
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Table 10. Northern District of Illinois 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  The Northern District of Illinois appears to practice 
equitable case distribution, but reversal rates are consistently inconsis-
tent.  See Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. ND ILL Patent Reversals to Docket  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Criticisms of the H.R. 5418 Proposal 
H.R. 5418 oversimplifies a problem that has many complex vari-
ables.  H.R. 5418 makes at least the five simplifying assumptions: 
1) the system is broken; 
2) that the greater the number of docket assignments, the greater 
the number of opinions, and with the greater number of opin-
ions, come fewer reversals; 
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3) technically trained law clerks will perform better than non-
technically trained law clerks; and 
4) forum shopping already exists as evidenced by the consolida-
tion of patent cases in a small set of courts with the composition 
of the set changing from year to year, so adding more certainty to 
judge selection won’t change the picture;  
  1.  It’s Not Broken 
Critics of the proposed legislation have offered various criticisms 
of this bill.  First, many, even including Judge Ellis239, do not think the 
system is broken. By some standards, the U.S. patent system is a 
model of efficiency.240  For example, Japan has a specialized patent 
trial court system.241  In a comparison of the U.S. and Japanese patent 
systems, the time from the filing of a case in the U.S. District Court to 
its resolution was compared to cases reaching final judgment in Japa-
nese patent courts.242  For cases terminating during the twelve month 
period ending June, 30, 1998, the median time for U.S. patent cases 
was 8 months as compared to Japanese intellectual property cases of 
1-2 years.243 
Still others criticize the data presented at the Subcommittee 
Hearing, opining that the creation of judges with specialized patent 
expert would be “an inefficient solution to a nonexistent problem.”244  
First, Professor Moore’s statistics on reversal rates are inconsistent,245 
and second, overlooks the large number of district rulings that are 
never appealed.246  Claim construction is an extremely narrow area, 
and the smaller the data sample, the worse the reversal rates appear.   
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 2 (2005). 
 240 Setsuko Asami, Japan-U.S. Patent Infringement Litigation Comparison: A Visit to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, CASRIP NEWSLETTER, Fall 1998, avail-
able at http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol5/newsv5i3asami.htm#top. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 See id. at tbl. 1-2. 
 244 Paul M. Shoenhard, Judging Trial Judges, IP LAW AND BUSINESS, March 2006, available 
at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/0f6472fc-e2b7-489f-92e2-a44b949bbeed/Present-
ation/PublicationAttachment/ca41a2a3-a964-44ad-8d25-
aa9f019318d0/Article_March_2006_Judging_Trial_Judges_Schoenhard.pdf. (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007). 
 245 “Although she reports a claim construction reversal rate of 34.5 percent, these reversals 
only result in 29.7 percent of claim construction cases being reversed or vacated by the court 
according to statistics Moore has published elsewhere.” Id.   
 246 Id. 
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Outside the narrow area of claim construction, for example, fed-
eral judges’ performance on patent trials is similar to that in all civil 
trials.  For example, of the 2,744 patent lawsuits terminated in fiscal 
year 2004, 2646 were disposed of before trial–a 3.6% trial rate that is 
only slightly higher than the 2% of all federal civil cases do not settle 
before trial.247  However, even though the numbers seems small, there 
is 1.8 times difference in the rate.  In the small sample of data for the 
district courts studied here for 5 years, the rate is 11.20% of all dock-
eted patent items to issued patent opinions to 8.99% of all non-patent 
docketed items to issued non-patent opinions.  For this period, patent 
opinions issued at a slightly reduced rate, 1.25 x times the rate of non-
patent opinions. 
  2.  Technical Expertise Does Not Equal Fewer Reversals 
H.R. 5418 provides funds for hiring law clerks with expertise in 
technical matters arising in patent and plant variety protection cases.  
Presumably, this position is similar to that of the technical assistant in 
the CAFC.  However, what sort of technical expertise should one 
have in the broad range of patents?  Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, nanotechnology?  Pat-
ent cases are not the only complex and infrequent case types.  For 
example, judges hear only one espionage case every five years.248  Se-
curities and antitrust cases are similarly complex.   
Aside from the issues of breadth of the technical patent matters, 
others point to studies which suggest that even technology savvy 
judges do no better than liberal-arts educated judges.249  The study by 
Professor Kimberly Moore found that there is no difference in the 
likelihood that judges with technical backgrounds will construe claims 
differently than those judges without technical backgrounds. 250  A 
recent review of 1,400 appeals found that district court judges with 
bachelors, or masters-in-science, degree have a 67% affirmance rate, 
which is better than the average of 60% found in this report.251  How-
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ever, the same report found that the best performing judges, with an 
affirmance rate of 71%, were those with Ivy-League degrees.252 
Supporters of specialized judges point to specialized courts in the 
United States–tax, bankruptcy, and administrative courts.  Creation 
of a specialized patent trial court system in the United States, similar 
to bankruptcy courts, has historically been controversial and re-
jected.253 Specialized patent and intellectual property courts currently 
exist in six countries, in addition to European Union’s proposed pat-
ent court system. 254   
  3.  Magistrate Judges Should Not Be Excluded 
Because magistrate judges are appointed by Article III judges, 
under 28 U.S.C. §631, and not by the President as the bill requires, 
magistrate judges are ineligible for designation.  Presumably, magis-
trate judges were not included because their duties vary so much from 
court to court.  However, this bill should be modified to allow for des-
ignation of magistrate judges for three reasons: 1) magistrate judges 
issue patent opinions in some court; 2) magistrate judges account for a 
significant percentage of pre-trial discovery in patent cases; and, 3) 
several patent-prominent district courts would not have the minimum 
requisite number of judges to qualify for the pilot program. 
First, magistrate judges in some courts decide patent cases and 
account for reversals.  For example, in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, magistrate judges issued approximately 37, or 14%, of all pat-
ent opinions during this period, while accounting for none of the re-
versals.   The Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of 
Illinois similarly have magistrate judges decide patent cases. 
Second, even in those district in which magistrate judges do not 
issue patent opinions, the magistrate judges account for a substantial 
percentage of patent activity on the docket.  In the Eastern District of 
Virginia and the Central District of California, the magistrate judges 
have the same percentage of patents in their dockets as do active 
judges.  See  Table 11. 
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Table 11. Comparison of Magistrate Judges and Judges: Patents as Percent-
age of Total Docket 
 
District 
Court 
Article III 
Judges 
Magistrate 
Judges 
E.D. TX 3.51% .75% 
N.D. CA 2.69% 4.97% 
E.D. VA 0.72% 0.5% 
N.D. ILL 1.77% 1.47% 
C.D. CA 2.45% 2.52% 
 
Finally, excluding magistrate judges eliminates several important 
district courts from the pilot program.  For example, none of the 
courts in Texas would qualify. 
  4.  Judge Shopping  
Designating patent judges will add certainty to “judge shopping” 
in forum selection.  Presently, defendants and plaintiffs both shop for 
either the quickest or slowest courts with the highest and lowest re-
versal rates–whichever suits their interests.255  The problem of “judge 
shopping” is added to the mix by designating and codifying “patent 
judges” under H.R. 5418.  Another important goal of the case assign-
ment system is that “no one should be able to manipulate the assign-
ment system in order to determine in advance which judge will get a 
case where the assignment is by lot.” 256  
As a result, courts take the security and secrecy of judge assign-
ment seriously.  For example, the local court rules of the Northern 
District of Illinois explicitly address this concern and provide for en-
forcement.  Any person that violates the case assignment procedures 
“shall be punished for contempt of court.”257   
For obvious security reasons, the deputies assigning the cases do 
not have access to the software that sets up the assignment decks. 
The deputies responsible for setting up the decks do not assign 
cases. This system together with the changes in the make up of 
the deck due to equalization and the shuffling of the names prior 
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to the actual assignment assures that staff cannot determine in 
advance the name of the judge to whom a case will be assigned.258 
Today, there is still an element of equitableness and randomness 
in patent case assignments–even in those jurisdictions where some 
judges are unofficial patent judges.  At the very least, this aspect of 
case assignment is not widely known, as evidenced by the bill hearings 
and testimony. 
  5.  Practice Does Not Make Perfect 
The data for these selected courts can be summarized in the table 
below.  The courts with the overall best records for reversals do not 
all follow the H.R. 5418 model.  The highest overall reversal rates are 
also in a court practicing the proposed H.R. 5418 case assignment 
method. See Table 12 - 14.  No strong correlation seems to exist be-
tween equitable case assignment procedures and designated patent 
judge assignment. 
Table 12.  Comparison of Court Averages (magistrates included) 
District 
Court 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Opinions 
Case 
Assignment 
System 
Patents as 
Percentage 
of Total 
Docket 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Docket 
E.D. TX 1.32% H.R. 5418 2.61% 0.00% 
N.D. CA 1.89% Equitable 3.37% 0.27% 
E.D. VA 6.25% Equitable 0.64% 0.72% 
N.D. ILL 7.10% Equitable 1.74% 1.98% 
C.D. CA 22.92% H.R. 5418 2.51% 0.36% 
 
Table 13. Comparison of Court Averages (no magistrate judges) 
District 
Court 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Opinions 
Case 
Assignment 
System 
Patents as 
Percentage 
of Total 
Docket 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Docket 
E.D. TX 0 H.R. 5418 3.51% 0.00% 
N.D. CA 2.2% Equitable 2.69% 0.41% 
E.D. VA 6.25% Equitable 0.72% 1.04% 
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N.D. ILL 6.47% Equitable 1.77% 2.03% 
C.D. CA 22.92% H.R. 5418 2.45% 0.69% 
 
Table 14. Comparison of Court Averages (magistrate judges only) 
District 
Court 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Opinions 
Case  
Assignment 
System 
Patents as 
Percentage 
of Total 
Docket 
Overall 
Reversal 
Rate to 
Patent 
Docket 
E.D. TX 11.11% H.R. 5418 .75% 1.47% 
N.D. CA 0 Equitable 4.97% 0 
E.D. VA 0 Equitable 0.5% 0 
N.D. ILL 5.88% Equitable 1.47% 1.54% 
C.D. CA 0 H.R. 5418 2.52% 0 
 
Combining the data for all judges from these courts yields that 
the reversal rates for judges deciding 3 or more cases a year is 4.57% 
versus 4.67% for judges deciding fewer than 3, if they decided any 
patent cases at all.   The percentage of the patent workload for those 
judges is only slightly higher: 3.71% to 2.27%. 
Similar studies indicate that the results in these five courts are 
not anomalous.  A preliminary report by a private data firm, examin-
ing1400 appeals, has found that district court judges who have heard a 
minimum of 100 patent cases have an identical affirmance rate, 
around 60%, as those judges that have heard fewer cases.259 
At least for these top five patent courts, for these top patent 
judges, and for this time period, the amount of docket assignments to 
designated patent judges does not appear to correlate to a lower re-
versal rate.  More experience does not cause lower reversal rates.   
C. “Secrets” of Success?  
If there is not strong correlation between the rate of reversals 
and the percentage of the workload, what explains the relative success 
in terms of reversals, and speed of adjudication, of a small court like 
the Eastern District of Virginia or the Eastern District of Texas?  
Why would the Northern District of Illinois, with as similar assign-
ment system to the Eastern District of Virginia, be cited for its high 
reversal rates?  Why would an assignment system similar to that prac-
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ticed by the Central District of California provide better or different 
results than the Eastern District of Texas?   
Possible answers lie in an examination of two indisputably re-
spected and successful forums: the ITC and the Eastern District of 
Virginia.  Both are known for the speed, and the ITC is especially 
noted for its low reversal rate.  What is the secret?   
  1.  The Eastern District of Virginia: The Master Docket 
There are three main ingredients to the success of patent litiga-
tion in the Eastern District: 1) the early setting of a fixed and “immu-
table” trial date; 2) a culture supporting a fixed and immutable trial 
date; and 3) a master docket.260   
The trial dates are rigorously maintained.  Judge Ellis has never 
granted a motion to continue a civil trial in twelve years.261  For exam-
ple, even a serious heart attack suffered by one the primary attorneys 
on the way to trial only delayed the trial until the following day.262  
This discipline is practiced by judges as well: judges must promptly 
consider and decide various non-dispositive and dispositive motions 
during the court of the trial.263   
The absence of a judge is no reason to delay a trial because of a 
feature unique to the Eastern District:  the master docket.264  The mas-
ter docket system has been in effect in the Eastern District since the 
1950s.265   
As of 1999, no other district court used the master docket con-
cept; instead, judges have individual dockets assigned to them.266  A 
judge will deal with those cases on their individual docket from begin-
ning to end.267  If a judge becomes ill or absent for any reason, or has 
conflicts with other delayed trials on their docket, another judge does 
not step in–the cases are delayed.268   In the master docket concept, 
all cases are not assigned to individual judges to hear all proceedings 
relating to that case from beginning to end.269  If a judge is unavailable, 
another judge will step in to hear that portion of the proceeding.270  
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The absence of a judge is never a reason to postpone a trial or hearing 
in the Eastern District.271 
The master docket system, however, is voluntary and hence frag-
ile–a single new judge could decide not to participate.272  As a result, 
the system may not scale well to an extremely large district court such 
as the Northern District of Illinois. 
  2.  ITC: Discovery 
One important difference between the ITC and most district 
court proceedings is in discovery.273  ITC discovery procedures must 
be completed quickly because there must be a briefing, a hearing, and 
a decision by the Administrative Law Judge within nine months of 
issuing an Initial Determination.274  Another difference is that a staff 
ITC Investigative Attorney participates in the discovery process.275 
3.  Eastern District of Texas: Rules of Practice for Patent Cases 
The Eastern District of Texas has formulated a set of “Rules of 
Practice for Patent Cases before the Eastern District of Texas.”276  On 
February 22, 2005, the Eastern District Court implemented a system 
of uniform patent rules as part of their local rules.277   
These rules apply to all civil actions filed in or transferred to this 
Court which allege infringement of a utility patent in a com-
plaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, or which 
seek a declaratory judgment that a utility patent is not infringed, 
is invalid or is unenforceable.278 
These rules augment the discovery rules of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26.279  First, the Initial Case Management Statement280 must 
also address, among others, the following patent claim specific issues:  
1) any modifications to the deadlines imposed by the Patent Rules; 2) 
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whether live testimony will be heard at a Claim Construction Hearing; 
and, 3) need for limits on discovery relating to claim construction.281   
Within 10 days after the Initial Case Management Conference, 
the plaintiff must serve on all parties a “Disclosure of Asserted Claims 
and Preliminary Infringement Contentions.”282 
These rules are flexible; judges may opt out of this rule by enter-
ing an order. 283  Accordingly, the court may  “accelerate, extend, 
eliminate, or modify the obligations or deadlines set forth”  in these 
Patent Rules based on the following factors  of a case, such as the 
complexity of the case, the number of patents, claims, products, or 
parties involved.284 
  4.  Northern District of California: Local Patent Rules 
The Northern District of California enacted Local Rule for Prac-
tice for Patent Cases, effective January 1, 2001.285  These rules were in 
effect for the period that the data were collected and apply to all civil 
actions originating in or transferred into the district that allege in-
fringement of a utility patent in any claim, counterclaim, or third party 
claim.286  The rules apply for declaratory judgments that a utility pat-
ent is infringed, invalid, or otherwise unenforceable.287   
The patent rules are comprehensive, tailored to patent adjudica-
tion, and provide guidance for each step of the process.  In addition to 
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 
in a patent case must adhere to additional requirements and deadlines 
in planning, discovery, confidentiality, and presentation of evidence.  
In issues of claim construction, separate Claim Construction Hearings 
are held. The parties must provide additional Claim Construction 
briefs in preparation for the hearing.  
For example, the rules describe in detail how each party must 
present the initial closures as follows: 
Separately for each opposing party, the “Disclosure of Asserted 
Claims and Preliminary Infringement Contentions” shall contain 
the following information: 
(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed by 
each opposing party; 
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(b) Separately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus, 
product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality 
(“Accused Instrumentality”) of each opposing party of which the 
party is aware. This identification shall be as specific as possible. 
Each product, device, and apparatus must be identified by name 
or model number, if known. Each method or process must be 
identified by name, if known, or by any product, device, or appa-
ratus which, when used, allegedly results in the practice of the 
claimed method or process; 
(c) A chart identifying specifically where each element of each 
asserted claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality, in-
cluding for each element that such party contends is governed by 
35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or ma-
terial(s) in the Accused Instrumentality that performs the 
claimed function; 
(d) Whether each element of each asserted claim is claimed to be 
literally present or present under the doctrine of equivalents in 
the Accused Instrumentality; 
(e) For any patent that claims priority to an earlier application, 
the priority date to which each asserted claim allegedly is enti-
tled; and 
(f) If a party claiming patent infringement wishes to preserve the 
right to rely, for any purpose, on the assertion that its own appa-
ratus, product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumen-
tality practices the claimed invention, the party must identify, 
separately for each asserted claim, each such apparatus, product, 
device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality that incor-
porates or reflects that particular claim. 288 
In two recent 2006 decisions,289 the CAFC has affirmed that par-
ties must comply with the requirements of the Patent Local Rules for 
the Northern District of California. “These decisions are a strong in-
dication that the Northern District's Patent Local Rules have real 
teeth, providing district court judges with considerable discretionary 
power in ensuring that parties comply with them, even when failing to 
do so is outcome determinative.”290  Dismissals based on enforcement 
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of local rules in patent cases are also harder to overturn, because 
those are subject to abuse-of-discretion review; whereas “claim con-
struction” or summary judgments are reviewed de novo. 291 
The Eastern District of Texas implemented their local rules 
based on the rules in the Northern District of California, which pro-
vide “a structure for the unique ‘claims construction’ portion of a pat-
ent case and move cases along through the initial stages with a mini-
mum of fuss and attention by a busy judge.”292  In addition to experi-
enced trial judges, these rules have been identified as common feature 
in the success and popularity of this district court with patent hold-
ers.293 
Other district courts have taken note of the Northern District’s 
local patent rules and have used them as a model.  The Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania adopted local patent rules that incorporate sev-
eral features of the rules that have generally been in effect in the 
Northern District of California and employed by various individual 
judges around the country.  
In contrast to the rules of the Northern District of California, 
however, the local patent rules for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania contain provisions that encourage an even swifter and more 
comprehensive approach to patent litigation.  To accomplish these 
objectives, the new Pennsylvania rules further provide additional cost 
and time saving measures, including default protective orders to pre-
serve confidentiality, Infringement Contention Timetable, and a 
Model Chart For Disputed Claim Terms, among others. 294 
Effective April 3, 2006, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California has issued proposed new rules of local 
practice for patent cases, also modeled after the Northern District of 
California.  These local rules cover, among other issues, initial disclo-
sures in patent cases, and case management and responses to discov-
ery.295  Like in other district courts, several improvements were made, 
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including a “Joint Claim Construction Worksheet” and a “Timeline 
for Patent Cases.”296 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the reversal data for the five districts studied, no appar-
ent correlation exists between the number of cases a patent judge 
hears and the reversal rate.  Furthermore, several of the districts are 
currently practicing the proposed case assignment system proposed in 
H.R. 5418.  For these courts, the overall performance of the court is 
not correlated with this type of assignment system.   
As the data suggests, magistrate judges already shoulder a sub-
stantial amount of patent-discovery and preliminary-motions work in 
all districts.  In some district courts, the magistrate judges decide the 
cases, contributing to the overall reversal rate.  Excluding magistrate 
judges from the system ignores their impact on patent adjudication.  
Additionally, the exclusion of magistrate judges by H.R. 5418 elimi-
nates two of the top patent district courts from receiving additional 
funding to improve patent litigation.  
The underlying secret to more efficient and accurate patent deci-
sions lies not in the assignment system, but in the local rules employed 
by the district courts.  Patent specific rules, especially with respect to 
discovery, ameliorate the problems caused by infrequent hearing of 
patent cases and reduce mistakes.  Patent specific deadlines ensure 
the timely processing of the case and reduce costs.  Patent rules pro-
vide the institutional learning necessary to bridge the experience gap 
caused by the loss of a trained patent jurist.  The money spent in train-
ing law clerks and judges in the pilot program is lost when one of 
these trained people leave.   
Rather than initiating a pilot program that merely formalizes ex-
isting court procedures, a pilot program should be initiated that im-
plements and measures the effect of a uniform set of patent specific 
rules in the busiest as well as the poorest performing district courts.  
Uniformity in rules would reduce forum shopping, costs, and offset 
the lack of experience of judges who infrequently hear patent cases.  
Coupled with uniform patent rules, the addition of old-fashioned vir-
tues of strict adherence to schedules, as in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, would improve patent adjudication.   
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